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SUMMARIES 
It is fitting that the celebration of Peirce's New 
Elements of Mathematics should be taking place in New 
York City, where Peirce was often to be found attending 
mathematical meetings at Columbia University and where 
he consulted the resources of the old Astor Library for 
the production of many of his writings. This paper 
considers Peirce--a lifelong student of logic--as he 
examined scientific and mathematical methodology on all 
levels, in ages past as well as in the then-contemporary 
literature. Peirce hoped to create an exact philosophy 
by applying the ideas of modern mathematical exactitude. 
He developed a semiotic pattern of mathematical proce- 
dure with which to test validity in all areas of inves- 
tigation. 
I1 me semble tout indiqud que la commdmoration du 
New Elements of Mathematics de Peirce se d&oule dans 
cette ville de New York 02 souvent Peirce assista B des 
rencontres mathgmatiques 2 l'Vniversit6 Columbia et 02 
il exploita la richesse de la biblioth&que Astor pour 
nombre de ses &rits. Cet article prdsente Peirce 
comme un perp&tuel Gtudiant de la logique, se penchant 
sur tous les aspects de la m&hodologie scientifique 
et mathdmatique, pas&e aussi bien que contemporaine. 
Peirce espdrait cr.Ger une philosophie exacte en 
appliquant les id&es de l'exactitude mathgmatique 
moderne. I1 mit au point un modele s6miotique d'un 
pro&d& mathdmatique propre a v6rifier la validit. des 
composantes d'une recherche. 
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Passenderweise wird des Erscheinens der "New 
Elements of Mathematics" von Peirce in New York gedacht, 
jener Stadt, in der Peirce so oft die Treffen der 
Mathematiker an der Columbia University besuchte und 
wo er die SchZitze der alten Astor Library bei der 
Niederschrift vieler seiner Arbeiten heranzog. In 
diesem Aufsatz wird Peirce, der sich ein Leben lang 
mit der Logik beschaftigte, vorgestellt bei seinen 
Studien der wissenschaftlichen und mathematischen 
Methodologie auf allen Ebenen, in der Vergangenheit 
wie in der damals modernen Literatur. Peirce wollte 
eine exakte Philosophie schaffen, indem er Gebrauch 
machte von modernen mathematischen Exaktheitsvorstel- 
lungen. Er entwickelte ein semiotisches Muster 
mathematischen vorgehens. womit sich die Wahrheit auf 
allen Gebieten wissenschaftlicher Forschung iiberpriifen 
lassen sollte. 
After more than 30 years of "searching for the method" that 
underlies Peirce's investigation of problems in science, logic, 
and philosphy, I find the evidence becoming ever weightier that 
the procedure he prescribes is to be found in the gold mine of 
his mathematics that Peircean scholars have thus far failed to 
explore and exploit. Rich nuggets lie about waiting to be picked 
up. Digging brings even greater intellectual rewards. Perhaps 
when the four volumes (five books) of Peirce's New Elements of 
Mathematics become required reading for students in Peircean 
studies, we shall begin to see in depth why he became the great- 
est native philosopher of mathematics and science ever to appear 
on the American scene [Eisele 19761. 
In celebrating his thought on this occasion we do so in the 
New York academic community to which he was so greatly attracted 
at the end of the 19th century. We know of Peirce's early asso- 
ciation with academe in Cambridge where his father was venerated 
as a leading American mathematician. We know of Peirce's 31- 
year association with outstanding mathematicians and scientists 
in Washington. We know a great deal about his mathematical 
ingenuity as the need arose in his astronomical and geodetic 
researches. We know of his 5-year lectureship in logic at The 
Johns Hopkins University when the celebrated Sylvester was 
Chairman of the Department of Mathematics and the equally famous 
Cayley became a visiting lecturer there during 1882. But it is 
not generally realized that after Peirce's retirement from the 
United States Coast and Geodetic Survey in 1891 he could often 
be found in the New York area where another great university 
and fine public library offered him the means of doing his 
"special great piece of work" [Peirce MS 12831. 
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BY this time Peirce was known for his contributions to 
mathematical logic and was well enough respected as a scholar 
to become an Editorial Contributor to the lo-volume Century 
Dictionary. In fact, he was responsible for all mathematical 
terms as well as those in logic, metaphysics, mechanics, astron- 
own weights, and measures. Moreover, the mathematical community 
in New York City also recognized his stature as a wide-ranging 
scholar. The American Mathematical Society had been founded 
as the New York Mathematical Society in 1888 through the efforts, 
among others, of Professor Fiske at Columbia University. Peirce 
was elected to membership in 1891. The Society met at Columbia 
University, and he could often be found among those in atten- 
dance and among those who read papers there. Fiske invited 
Peirce to submit his mathematical innovations for publication 
in the Society's Bulletin and Cassius Jackson Keyser, also a 
mathematician at Columbia, persuaded him to write for the Hibbert 
Journal. Others on the Columbia staff and among Peirce's cor- 
respondents were Professors Montague of Philosophy and Giddings 
of Sociology. Especially important was‘James M. Cattell, the 
Columbia psychologist who had editorial charge of the Science 
Series for G. P. Putnam's Sons, who exchanged letters with 
Peirce for 13 years beginning in 1898 and greatly encouraged 
his projects in the history of science. Another New Yorker, 
Theodore De Vinne, publisher of the prestigious Century Dic- 
tionary (his bust can still be found today in a ground-level 
passageway of Low Library), urged Peirce to translate into 
English the Epistle of Petrus Peregrinus on the Lodestone 
(Paris, MS 7378) that Peirce had examined while on a Coast Sur- 
vey mission to Paris in 1883. 
Peirce, it should be noted, was not only interested in rare 
books but was considered an authority by librarians and collec- 
tors alike. George A. Plimpton, head of Ginn and Company in 
New York, was a famous collector of rare works in mathematics 
and science who often sought Peirce's advice, as did occasion- 
ally the acquisitions department of the New York Public Library, 
then the Astor Library, where Peirce spent many an hour in 
research for his various writings. Students in the graduate 
course in the history of mathematics at Columbia were often 
invited to view rare treasures in Plimpton's private library 
during the 1920s. Twenty-five years after Peirce's article 
entitled "Campanus" appeared in Science, I was given just such 
an opportunity, and was permitted to handle the 13th-century 
copy of Euclid about which Peirce had written, just as he had 
done. There was, as well, the Rollandus Arithmetic of 1424 that 
Peirce had described so glowingly in the New York Times in 1894. 
It was another 23 years, however, before my path again touched 
that of Peirce. This happened in 1949 when I discovered a letter 
to Plimpton from Peirce dated May 18, 1901, in which he described 
what the contents of a newly acquired book must be were it indeed 
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a copy of the great Liber Abaci of Fibonnaci. The letter had 
been tucked under the back cover of that volume stored with 
the rest of the Plimpton Collection--by that time in Special 
Collections at Butler Library. 
Closely related to Peirce's interest in rare books was a 
more than antiquarian interest in the history of science, which 
he regarded as an essential tool in creating the structure of 
his logic of science. As Peirce put it, "that which the author 
had in mind throughout his studies in the history of science 
was to gain an understanding of the whole logic of every path- 
way to the truth" [Peirce MS 12691. Further, "It is not so 
much the history of science as it is the history of sound sci- 
entific thinking which I am considering" [Peirce MS 12801. 
And again, "All my life long I have been a devoted student of 
logic. Logic is sometimes called the art of reasoning.... But 
the most essential part of the business of reasoning is the an- 
alysis of reasoning" [Peirce MS 12801. This analysis led him 
to the methodology of mathematics which had always served him 
slavishly. 
At the time of Peirce's release from Coast Survey responsi- 
bilities, a revolution of considerable magnitude in mathematics 
of the late 19th century was peaking in Europe. Peirce had be- 
come totally committed to the new movement, which realized the 
pressing need for new mathematical foundations. He struggled 
to obtain a hearing for his own maturing logical and philosoph- 
ical schemata which reflected the "new look" in the mathematics 
of that time. In 1898 Peirce wrote that "philosophy requires 
exact thought, and all exact thought is mathematical thought.... 
I can only say that I have been bred in the lap of the exact 
sciences and if I know what mathematical exactitude is, that is 
as far as I can see the character of my philosophical reasoning" 
[Peirce MS .438]. 
What Peircean scholarship has not as yet noted or emphasized 
is that Peirce's practice of such mathematical exactitude re- 
flects the new set theory and new mathematical concepts of con- 
tinuity and the nature of the real number system. It also 
reflected advances in algebra that had been made by his father, 
who advanced a linear associative algorithm making possible 
vector and matrix representation. Peirce also used a geometry 
that had been generalized into a topology embracing non-Euclidean 
as well as Euclidean forms, one in which projective geometry is 
but a chapter and Euclidean geometry a footnote. The black hole 
of Carl Sagan's television series would not have been strange 
to Peirce had its existence been postulated in his time, for he 
struggled unsuccessfully for some time with star measurements 
in the hope of demonstrating that space had a curvature hyper- 
bolic in character. His approach was always contemporary and 
as up to date as Peirce could be. Consider, for example, his 
letter to Judge Russell in 1894: "My special business is to 
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bring mathematical exactitude, I mean modern mathematical exac- 
titude into philosophy, and to apply the ideas of mathematics 
in philosophy . .." [Peirce correspondence, letters to Russell]. 
Similarly, in what Peirce termed a "very recent discovery" 
(1906), I believe he attempted through his existential graphs 
to make a direct application of the Riemannian sheeted surface 
that had been invented to represent the character of multiple- 
valued analytic functions. Reference to special tinting made 
it possible for Peirce to distinguish between surfaces of 
actuality and surfaces of possibility [Peirce 1931, 4.573-4.5781. 
Not long ago a New York philosopher, well aware of Peirce's 
reputation as the father of pragmatism, challenged a statement 
I had made that to understand pragmatism in a Peircean sense 
one must approach the concept in terms of Peirce's scientific 
methodology--in terms of the mathematical procedure that he 
called Theorematic Reasoning. Let me offer but one example to 
illustrate this. Young students have all been subjected to 
such reasoning in high school geometry or algebra. It may be 
roughly described as follows. Some iconic or symbolic form is 
adopted to represent the given premises. If the assumed con- 
clusion cannot be drawn directly from the iconic diagram or 
symbolic equation, a modification of the form suggests itself 
and is tried. Further modifications of the modification may be 
needed to reach the desired end. This process leads to new re- 
lations between parts not originally mentioned, but now helpful 
in nearing the conclusion. The choice of modification or trans- 
formation cannot be accounted for, Peirce admits [Peirce 1931, 
5.81. That is where ingenuity steps in, for which Peirce has 
no explanation. It might be called instinct or intuition, or 
Galileo's il lume naturale, to which Peirce openly subscribed 
in the process of adopting a hypothesis which he called the 
"abductive" guess. 
Peirce's procedure in investigating the truth of any scien- 
tific assumption is analogous to the above. He directs one 
"to study what effects the hypothesis, if embraced, must have 
in modifying our expectations in regard to future experience. 
Thereupon we make experiments . . . in order to find how far 
these new conditional expectations are going to be fulfilled. 
Insofar as they greatly modify our former expectations of ex- 
perience and insofar as we find them . . . we accord to the hy- 
pothesis a due weight in determining all our future conduct 
and thought" [Peirce 1931, 7.1151. Moreover we have only "to 
persist in this same method of research and we shall gradually 
be brought around to the truth" [Peirce 1931, 7.1151. This is 
the core of Peirce's pragmatism, this mathematico-scientific 
procedure. Peirce clearly stated that the pragmatic maxim "is 
simply the experimental method . . . which is the invariable 
procedure of all science" [Peirce MS 3201. He clearly stated 
that "it is the procedure even of mathematics as Thomas Beddoes 
showed in 1792" [Peirce MS 3201. 
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"The doctrine of exact philosophy . . . is that all danger of 
error in philosophy will be reduced to a minimum by treating 
the problem as mathematically as possible, that is, by construc- 
ting some sort of a diagram representing that which is supposed 
to be open to the observation of every scientific intelligence, 
and thereupon mathematically . . . deducing the consequences of 
that hypothesis" [Peirce 1976, 4, x]. It is no wonder that in 
every classification of the sciences, mathematics heads every 
list, while philosophy, to be exact "must rest on mathematical 
principles" [Peirce 1976, 4, 2731. 
"The construction of a diagram" mentioned above reflects 
Peirce's insistence that all thinking is diagrammatic and is 
carried on in terms of signs. Diagrams are but iconic images-- 
in geometry, pictures; in algebra, letters and symbols of oper- 
ation; in normal human communication, gestures, words, and rules 
for verbal construction. All of this is basic nowadays in the 
newly developing academic discipline called semiotics in which 
Peirce is heralded as a founder. 
Not only is mathematical methodology of primary importance 
in the analysis of Peirce's thought, but an understanding of 
mathematical substance is in itself a necessary tool. As an 
illustration I turn to Peirce's Collected Papers in which he 
writes of the need for an understanding of the mathematical 
concept of continuity, which Peirce noted "is the leading idea 
of the differential calculus and all useful branches of mathe- 
matics" [Peirce 1931, 1.164, 1.1651. He tells of the great part 
that continuity plays in all scientific thought, increasingly 
greater, the more scientific that thought is; "it [continuity] 
is the master key which adepts tell us unlocks the arcana of 
philosophy." He speaks of drawing a line and notes that it is 
continuous to the eye in an ordinary sense. Readers of the 
Collected Papers may easily be misled, for three dots of omission 
replace Peirce's line in the manuscript as well as an entire 
paragraph explaining the positioning of points on it. In 
Peirce's original manuscript the eye trained to interpret the 
detail notes that what he has in mind is not the ordinary line 
of real numbers known to high school students. As Peirce drew 
it, his line is the golden key to understanding space and spatial 
relationships throughout his total thought. That linear icon 
is the basic line of reference in analytic projective geometry, 
the line of rationality, where all numbers of the real number 
system including infinity are accommodated by a specific process 
of construction. Infinity is represented by a point right there 
on the page, not "out there" in an inaccessible "somewhere." 
Peirce's diagram is an immediate giveaway to the person able 
to recognize it as a basic late-19th-century icon in the non- 
Euclidean geometry underlying Peirce's thought. It is the 
geometry in which one can "pass through infinity" as Peirce 
frequently instructs his reader to do. This is no mental 
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aberration on his part. This is the "new look" in the geometry 
that pervades space science today. This line returns into it- 
self, as he so often says--a statement that must shake into 
disbelief any Euclidean-minded Peircean scholar. 
This is only the beginning, this concept of l-space. As 
for 2-space, Peirce often refers to a surface the properties of 
which are analogous to those of the line. He describes its 
iconic representation in terms of a length of ribbon given one 
twist before its ends are joined together [Peirce 1976, 3, 110, 
1111. Were they fastened without the twist, a two-sided cylin- 
drical surface would result. A single twist makes it a one- 
sided, unbounded surface returning into itself like the line 
previously mentioned. Carrying the analogous treatment to 
three-dimensional space, Peirce describes an unbounded space 
with a twist in it, "having a different shape from the one we 
know," one that is conceivable even sensually. "A man would 
accustom himself to it," according to Peirce, who deemed our 
own as "by no means the easiest to comprehend" [Peirce 1976, 3, 
111). 
The mathematician responsible for devising the twisted sur- 
face just referred to was, of course, Mijbius, and the surface 
is the well-known Mobius strip. Peirce was well acquainted with 
Mijbius' Der barycentrische Calcul (1827) and its homogeneous 
coordinate representation. In a 40-page letter to William James 
(February 26, 1909) Peirce revealed that at that time he was 
"decidedly inclined to think that when we speak of Logical 
Analysis of a Concept and a Real Definition of it what we gen- 
erally mean is analogous to Color Analysis." He gives a mathe- 
matical demonstration of its meaning using all the elements of 
the barycentric notation. He proves several theorems from pro- 
jective geometry as well and finally declares: "I have now 
sufficiently exhibited the characteristics of the barycentral 
notation. For a considerable time I was much occupied by the 
question whether or not a notation similar to this would not 
represent the modes in which concepts are, or should be, repre- 
sented as compounded in definitions, with a leaning to the 
affirmative" [Peirce 1976, 3, 8501. 
The extent of the influence of these non-Euclidean elements 
on Peirce's philosophy has yet to be fully determined. One can 
only hope that one day Peirce will be recognized as a precursor 
in the chapter on the curvature of space which Peirce at one 
time attempted to prove to be negative. As it is, the distin- 
guished Princeton economists Baumol and Goldfeld have staked 
out a claim for Peirce as an early precursor of mathematical 
economics [Eisele 1979, 69-72, 2531. Similarly, following an 
important correction in the editing of a sign in the Collected 
Papers [Peirce 1931, 4.1961, where Peirce's denumerable multi- 
tude should be represented by the trefoils of his original man- 
uscript rather than by the alephs of Georg Cantor, he may well 
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be regarded as a precursor in the field of transfinites as well, 
[Peirce 1976, 3, 55, 3331. Above all, his philosophical concept 
of continuity was dependent on this analysis. 
These few illustrations serve to give some idea of the new 
areas of research now open in the treasure trove of Peirce's 
thought. When viewed from the platform of modern mathematics, 
it becomes a luminous tapestry all the threads of which are 
woven into a harmonious whole. Peirce was essentially a student 
of methodology, relentlessly searching for the means of setting 
up hypotheses and establishing their validity. We have already 
noted that investigations into episodes in the history of science 
were, to a large extent, exercises in the study of past scienti- 
fic procedures and their evolution into modem techniques. 
"People forget," he wrote, "that people could not have had the 
conception which we attach to that word [truth] in its scientific 
sense, before they had any science. Yet if we analyse our mean- 
ing it will be apparent at once--What we mean by a scientific 
truth is a formula or rule predicting what phenomena will be 
observable under definite conditions, and which is verified by 
everybody who puts it to the proper tests" [Peirce MS 12801. 
In Peirce's last poverty-stricken years he would have found 
comfort in the thought that he might be honored in New York 
City--as he has been today, May 8, 1981, 67 years after his 
death. His own personal cry can still be heard in an early 
lecture on Galileo when he was moved to write: "It is a bitter 
thing to be put into the world by God to do a special great 
piece of work, to be hungering and thirsting to do it and to be 
prevented by the jealousies and coldness of men. Galileo did 
something for the world; but he did not do half of what he might 
have done, had helping hands been extended to him.... Do not 
fancy that the blocking of the wheels of progress is confined 
to by-gone times and to strange countries. There is plenty of 
it here today" [Peirce MS 12831. 
When Peirce's message is finally clarified in terms of its 
mathematico-scientific orientation, we shall find that America's 
intellectual history will have been enriched by a chapter cele- 
brating a native son as important to America as Leibniz has been 
to Germany and Poincare' has been to France. It brings some sat- 
isfaction to know that a scholar as reliable and prestigious as 
c. P. Snow classed Peirce, "the analytical philosopher," along 
with Willard Gibbs as one of the two most original abstract 
thinkers born in America. It is a sad comment that Snow felt 
compelled to add that, nevertheless, "It is uncommon to meet an 
American student who has heard of either of those two great 
names" [Snow 1981, quoted in Fuller 19811. 
It will be through the continuing efforts of scholars, work- 
ing with the new materials only now coming to light--like The 
New Elements of Mathematics honored today--that Peirce, without 
doubt, will be rescued from the obscurity Snow laments, and will 
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be properly appreciated as a philosopher who can only be appre- 
ciated ii one first recognizes the extent to which he was a 
mathematician, with a mathematician's outlook adopting a con- 
sciously mathematical methodology for virtually everything he 
undertook. 
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